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Does the former Soviet space have any historico-regional signiﬁcance, or is it really no
more than an area occupied by an imperial aspirant, taking advantage of the weakness of
European and Asian powers following the First World War? The author argues that the
term ‘‘Eurasia’’ is merely a convenient way of referring to what had been Soviet territory.
Recent history has seen attempts to endow it with a larger civilizational signiﬁcance, but
these attempts are rooted in Russian myth-making. Those areas which understand
themselves as European and are part of historical Christendom will return to the
‘‘democratic,’’ consumer culture of Europe as rapidly as they can. The nationalities and
small nations of the Caucasus and central Asia, predominantly Islamic, are becoming part
of the ‘‘Middle East,’’ as it is commonly understood in contemporary geopolitical
discourse. Portions of what had been the eastern and southern parts of the Soviet Union
are drifting into the orbit of China, and even India may exert a certain inﬂuence. The
methods used by non-Soviet and Soviet scholars alike to study the Soviet Union are almost
entirely irrelevant to contemporary scholarship.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Eurasia, let us suppose, can be described as a region, that
most ﬂexible, indeed indeﬁnite designation of place. The
Eurasia Foundation does so, albeit describing their desig-
nation of Eurasia as a region ‘‘not very precise, but func-
tional’’.1 What sort of function is being referenced? Is
‘‘Eurasia’’ merely a handy way of referring to ‘‘post-Soviet
space’’? Or does it have some larger meaning that has
survived the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? Whether
regions are larger or smaller than nations, they must
possess some kind of unity, or at least commonality, in the
minds of their inhabitants. Regions are spaces where – atsia Foundation, email
Research Center, Hanyang Univera minimum – people recognize each other in some orderly
fashion, or understand the world similarly – where some
events have a common resonance. If regions are, like
nations, partly imagined communities, the term also
suggests commonphysical features, wheremountains yield
to plains, or plains to mountains. So regions are formed in
people’s minds by the ﬂow of history in the material world.
To begin with the obvious, Europe is, among other
things, most emphatically a region, although at some
times and by some people it has been regarded as two.22 ‘‘For many centuries the eastern limits of Europe remained deter-
mined by the dominant Catholic religion’’, writes Milan Hauner, ‘‘and
thus corresponded to those of the Sacrum Imperium Romanum. The
Orthodox Christians of the Byzantine Empire and of Russia.were simply
ignored. Only after the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in
1453 did Europe readmit the Orthodox Christians in the East as cobe-
lievers.’’ See Milan Hauner (1994). Richard Pipes in recent years has
asserted that Russia’s Orthodox Church and culture more generally stand
outside the general European framework. See his ‘‘East is East,’’ The New
Republic, April 26 & May 3, 1999, pp. 102–103.
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more than just a peninsula jutting out from the Asian
landmass. In physical terms, it is an intricately subdivided
appendage of the enormous, ﬂat plain of Asia and
contrasts with it markedly in its plentiful mountains and
rivers, so helpful in serving as boundaries. In historical–
cultural terms, it has been the site of rationalism, science,
capitalism and individualism, and of the myths of
Prometheus and Faust that so well expressed them. China,
‘‘the Middle kingdom’’, is in some ways similar.3 Like
Europe in more recent time, China long regarded itself as
the center of the world, surrounded by vassals and
barbarians. Europe has regional resonance because of its
material power, its lengthy common experience, because
its people have gradually come to see themselves as kin,
because it was Christendom.4 Its attractiveness to its
neighbors at present is substantially due to the prosperity
it allegedly confers on its members. Whether, then,
Turkey can become part of Europe is no simple matter but
will have to happen on many levels.5 Whether China can
absorb the Uighurs of Xinjiang Province or the Tibetans is
a similar question, but the Tibetans, unlike the Turks, will
not be consulted about their wishes.
But what of Russia? What of Russia’s extremely well-
known position between Europe and something else, often
described as Asia? Is Russia fated to become wholly Euro-
pean, as the 19th-century Westernizers believed and as
most progressive Russians today hope? Or did Russia have
some special non-European identity, as the Slavophiles and
their followers maintained? Peter the Great emphatically
and Catherine implicitly accepted the premise that Russia
was not European, or not wholly so, and would have to
‘‘become’’ European. Do these nineteenth-century distinc-
tions have meaning in our time?
Until the last thirdof the 19th century, the term ‘‘Eurasia’’
does not seem to have had much signiﬁcance in Russia. But
with the continuation of the Russian Empire’s territorial
movement south and west across the Asian landmass and
with the acquisition of more and more non-Slavic subjects,
the situation changed. The novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, the
‘‘philosopher’’ Nicholas Danilevsky (1822–1885) and
nationalists of varying views were less and less disposed to
ratify the left-wing intelligentsia’s hopes that Russia would
become wholly European – that is, liberal-socialist, secular,
law governed.6 Danilevsky in fact thought Europe to be
merely an offshoot of Asia, in that the ‘‘progressive’’ culture
of Europe took shape in reaction to the world of Asia.
Especially those Russians offended by European criticism of
Russia – most of them nationalists – began to imagine3 For a quick and useful (if occasionally too quick) look at China’s place
in contemporary geopolitics, see Parag Khanna (2008a).
4 Novalis, Die Christenheit oder Europa. See Walter Jens (1988–1992).
5 ‘‘Turkey,’’ wrote Samuel Huntington, ‘‘is a typical torn country,’’
meaning that it is split between the generally European orientation of its
elite and the much more Muslim outlook of the ‘‘poorer and rural’’
segments of society. See Odom (1997).
6 For Danilevsky’s ‘‘breathtaking spatial vision of a future Russia-
dominated Pan-Slav Union stretching from the Adriatic to the Paciﬁc,’’ see
Milan Hauner (1990). Danilevsky’s connection to Slavophilism is stressed
in Andrzej Walicki (1975).adifferent sortof Russiandestiny,whichwould stake a claim
to leadership in Asia, and which might ultimately lead to
Russianhegemony– spiritual ormaterial – overbothEurope
and Asia.
Russia belonged, they thought, neither to the liberal,
rationalistic, rootless world produced by the French Revo-
lution in Europe, nor to what they regarded as the
somnolent, timeless empires of Asia. Russia was rather the
contemporary manifestation of institutions whose histor-
ical task it had been to bridge the gap between the two
worlds. Russia, it was imagined or hoped, would achieve
what Chingis Khan had almost achieved in the pre-modern
context: an empire based in the Asian heartland, but
controlling the volatile and creative peripheries, Europe
above all, and bringing a vast territory into civilizational
interaction – only after considerable bloodshed of course.
This was the famous ‘‘PaxMongolica.’’ The Ottoman Empire
had approached this goal at the apogee of its power, but
would give way to Russia, which, uniquely, could harness
the physical and spiritual might of Christian Europe to the
task, while sloughing off its vulgar and shallow
materialism.7
The theoreticians of Geopolitics, Karl Haushofer in
Germany and Halford Mackinder in England, produced
more hard-headed and materialist speculations of the
same kind, based on the physical geography of the entire
Asian and European landmass.8 Of course a less ideolog-
ical version of the post-Mongol developments can also be
conceptualized. In the early modern period – let us say
between 1450 and 1800 – the Eurasian landmass was
dominated by the Muscovite Empire, the Ottoman
Empire, the Safavid Empire of Iran, and the Ming and Qing
empires of China. A seminar sponsored by the National
Endowment for the Humanities at Harvard University in
the United States in the summer of 2009 argues that ‘‘by
1800, the[se] Mongol successor states had knit the
continents of Asia, Europe and Africa into one loosely
connected though vital civilizational system’’ which, it is
claimed, may be called ‘‘Eurasian Civilization’’.9 But
assessing this vast and almost entirely cultural linkage
takes us well beyond: the relationship between post-
Soviet space and ‘‘Eurasia.’’
Those who created the new concept of Eurasia
resentfully took cognizance of the previous paradigm of
Europe, while aspiring to subdue and transcend it.
Imperial Russia, in the last-half century of its existence,
could not seriously aspire to any such global role. But
after 1917, the new Bolshevik polity could, and when they
realized this, many non-Communist intellectuals gave up
their opposition to Communism and returned to their
homeland under the rubric of the ‘‘changing landmarks’’7 The Pan-Slav Union, which Danilevsky foresaw, would be ‘‘the
crowning achievement of the past efforts of Philip of Macedon, Alexander
the Great, and Emperor Constantine. [Russia would succeed] Byzantium
and Ottoman Turkey as the ontological center of the world.’’ Milan
Hauner (1990).
8 On Mackinder, see Geoffrey Parker (1985). On Haushofer, see Andreas
Dorpalen (1984).
9 Letter of invitation to participate in the Harvard conference, in my
possesion.
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Marxism, but they had accepted the fundamental idea
that the Soviet Union was heir to some combination of
the predecessor empires that, one way or another, had
striven to unite Europe and Asia: those of Alexander the
Great, the Byzantines, the Chingisids, the Iranian Safavids,
the Ottoman sultans.11
At the beginning of the Soviet period, ideology seemed
to run the show in the Bolsheviks’ new civilization. ‘‘Eura-
sianism’’ was a tolerated political point of view in the
Russian emigration only. Over time, however, there
emerged an imperial strain within the Soviet leadership,
one source of which was the aspiration ﬁnally to realize
such a world empire based on the Eurasian landmass,
which would end the destructive ‘‘regional’’ division
between Asia and Europe. According to Hauner, ‘‘[it was].
the Eurasianist movement.[that] defended the complete
symbiosis between the European and Asian parts of the
former Russian empire’’.12 The intellectual exchange among
a fascinating group of Russian intellectuals epitomized the
initial attempt to deﬁne what wemay anachronistically call
‘‘Soviet space’’ in these terms. Although nothing like their
views was ever accepted by the Soviet government, many
important ﬁgures in the Soviet Union at its zenith regarded
themselves as Eurasian in more ways than one.13 And this
kind of ‘‘Eurasian idea’’ is very much alive among Russian
groups at present (Ziuganov, 1995).
If all this makes some sense, it should serve to prob-
lematize the question that concerns us here. What is the
future of the vast territorial sprawl of the former Soviet
Union? How it is to be studied, by whom, and to what
end? If Eurasia today is more than a mere synonym for
post-Soviet space in a non-speciﬁc sense, then it should
continue to have some kind of general regional signiﬁ-
cance now that the Soviet Union is no more. If on the
other hand the Soviet Union was merely a fortuitous
collection of trophy pieces, then over time the idea of
‘‘Eurasian Studies’’ is likely to lose any genuine signiﬁ-
cance and become a purely formalist term, as Eurasia
demonstrates its regional insubstantiality. I believe the
latter is the far more likely prospect, given Russia’s difﬁ-
culties at home and abroad and the emerging shape of the
global economy. Alexander Motyl made one aspect of the
matter apparent more than a decade ago: ‘‘the future of
Sovietology is clear,’’ he wrote. ‘‘Post-Soviet Studies will
be comparative nationality studies with the difference of
course, that the nationalities will be called nations and
their republics designated states. Soviet Studies will
become, nolens volens, a form of comparative politics’’
(Motyl, 1992). This is a part of our contemporary reality.
‘‘Russia–Eurasia is over,’’ wrote Dmitri Trenin, ‘‘suddenly,
but ﬁnally.’’ (Trenin, 2002).10 On ‘‘Changing Landmarks’’, see Hilda Hardeman (1994); Williams
(1968). On the ‘‘Signposts’’ or ‘‘Landmarks’’ manifesto, which gave rise to
the controversy, see Litvak (2000).
11 Antoshchenko (2003). See also Savitskii (1931).
12 Hauner, ‘‘Disintegration,’’ p. 221.
13 Hauner, What is Asia to Us?, pp. 60–65. We might recall Molotov’s
famous remark to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka in 1940 that
‘‘We are Asiatics too.’’But what politics should we compare, and to what?
And how? What does the Czech Republic have in
common with Kamchatka? Or Georgia with the land of
the Chukchi and other ‘‘small peoples of the north’’
(Slezkine, 1994; Huber, 2004)? It would certainly appear
that these nationalities, peoples, or nations can in many
cases only be compared to their nearer neighbors, many
of whom are and have been outside the Soviet orbit.
Surely they found themselves in the same polity because
the Imperial power occupying the heart of Asia brought
them into its orbit. It held them there partially through
force, but also because in recent centuries these small
peoples could only be peripheries of some larger and
more powerful center. But the Soviet Union has dis-
appeared and the Russian Federation is a much weaker
entity, and – above all – the creation of empires calls for
rather different forms of power today than in the time of
Alexander the Great or even Stalin. Although size is still
important, the size of one’s economy trumps the size of
one’s military establishment.
To turn to an important and related matter: How was
the Soviet Union studied and by whom? Can similar
methods prove effective now or in the short-term future?
In the past, Soviet studies almost always began by intro-
ducing aspiring scholars ﬁrst to the study of Russian
history, ideology, and politics, then to the Soviet command
economy, then – if one wanted to venture beyond the
Russian rulers of the Soviet Union – the language of
a ‘‘minority’’ nationality. All this went together in an ‘‘area
studies’’ model, combining language, history, social science
and economics. Everyone studying Soviet Estonia for
instance, had to know Russian and a detailed account of
Russia’s revolution. In many cases, only later would the
student acquire the Estonian language and some knowl-
edge of the Baltic. Such training now seems most anach-
ronistic, if not absolutely quaint. As Blair Ruble already
wrote some years ago, ‘‘The very existence of a discernible
community of scholars focusing on the societies, cultures,
and political and economic systems of the various states
and territories that were under the control of the Soviet
regime is in question.’’ (Ruble, 1995). That question has
largely been answered in the last decade. What had been
an organized community of disciplinary specialists linked
in a fundamentally political task is now a group of politi-
cally unafﬁliated historians and language teachers. Analysis
of post-Soviet space, that is to say, will be in the hands of
a larger and more disciplinarily diverse group of scholars,
not any longer in such close touch with one another. Nor, in
all likelihood, will these students be so dominated by
American viewpoints or by the Cold War sense of
a common foe, although that sense has been more durable
than might have been expected.
Such reﬂections return us to the present and future.
Centrifugal forces are pulling apart what used to be the
Soviet Union, although they differ in their nature and
strength depending on where we look. The two aspects of
the post-Soviet situation that unites Russia with all the
other successor states are the plunge into poverty that
accompanied the dissolution of empire, and the subse-
quent growth of inequality. Recovery has varied with
surrounding conditions and access to resources. On the
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historical continuity has proven decisive, with the partial
exception of the other East and South Slavic nations:
Belarus and those portions of eastern Ukraine not subject
to heavy Polish inﬂuence. Even Serbia may be moving
away from the straightforwardly pro-Russian point of
view of nineteenth-century Panslavism. But everywhere
else, it has become clear how much the nations of Europe
resented the tutelage of their Russian masters, which they
regarded as having deprived them of agency and kept
them outside the charmed circle of Western consumer
society, in which they very much wanted to participate.
Because that society has ﬂourished most luxuriantly in
the West, the conﬂict with post-Soviet Russia is intimately
connected with the previously mentioned divide between
the wealthy western and the poorer eastern parts of
Europe (Chirot, 1989). Being in the Soviet Union/Eurasia
meant remaining in the backward ‘‘Eastern’’ Europe.
Again with the exception of the Eastern Slavs, very few
Europeans anywhere want anything to do with something
provisionally called ‘‘Eurasia’’.14 After varyingly painful
transitions, they have embraced the market and its
culture, often with enthusiasm. But as this is written, the
collapse of the European economy is opening up the old
ﬁssures between the wealthy West and the poorer East of
Europe once more.
The Bush administration liked to speak of the ‘‘old
Europe’’ and the ‘‘new Europe’’, but in fact it appears that –
except, perhaps, in the immediate aftermath of economic
catastrophe – the old divisions will heal, and that the
Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians
are part of a European region and will be studied as such.
Especially with the passage of time, students of Estonia or
Hungary will not be trained in any essentialway differently
than students of France or Germany. Methodological
disputes of the late Soviet period about whether ‘‘totali-
tarian’’ or authoritarian points of view are better suited to
the study of the Soviet Union are absolutely irrelevant
now – although what the overall Soviet experience meant
for the regions and peoples that passed through its crucible
is not.
In Poland and the Czech Republic, two of the issuesmost
prominently before the public are directly connected to the
recent Soviet past. One is the question of how far and how
fast the political elites have been moving in the direction of
a neo-liberal economy. This issue has been the subject of
sharp disagreement, for example, in the Czech Republic.
Partisans of Vacˇlav Havel and Vacˇlav Klaus have quite
different views. (It likewise remains to be seen, of course,
what impact the worldwide depression will have on that
development.) The second issue also seemed to have been
decided: both publics accepted their governments’ decision
to make their territory available to the United States to
establish an anti-missile system. The decision to build the
shield is offensive and threatening to the Russians in both14 On one day, May 1, 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined
the European Union – some hundred million people. See Khanna, Second
World, p. 4.practical and symbolic ways. No doubt Polish and Czech
public opinionwould be far less supportive, had it not been
for their recent and vivid experience of the Soviet-spon-
sored ‘‘friendship of the peoples’’. But with the Obama
government seeking some accommodationwith Russia, the
fate of the (expensive) missile system has become less
certain. In Central Europe, particularly among the Western
Slavs, however, the impulse to seek the friendship and
protection of the United States after the Cold War is strong
and deep. Both the Polish and the Czech governments
bypassed NATO and the European Union to negotiate
directly with the United States. The historically derived and
profoundly rooted hostility between Russians and Poles is
unlikely to take the form of military conﬂict in the near
future, but it provides a striking example of the Western
orientation of much of central and eastern Europe. After
Soviet occupation in 1940, the Baltic states feel the same
way.15
Everywhere else in the Soviet borderlands the situa-
tion is much less clear, and liberal institutions have been
slow to come into existence. Ukraine is struggling and
Belarus remains extremely close to the Soviet prototype.
‘‘Ukraine,’’ according to its leading Western historian,
‘‘occupies a crucial space at the interface of two of the
great geopolitical ideas of the twentieth century –‘Europe’
and ‘Eurasia’ – and will have a crucial inﬂuence on how
both of these ideas are being reconstructed at the
beginning of the new millennium.’’ (Wilson, 2000). It is
taking both ordinary Russians and the Russian political
class considerable time to recognize Ukraine as a wholly
independent nation, because of the well-known historical
entanglements of the two nations. Indeed divisions
between different parts of Ukraine stand out today, as
they long have: what has been called the ‘‘fault line’’
between Orthodoxy and Catholicism runs through
Ukraine; and whether Ukraine has distinct borders has
also been hotly contested.16 Ukraine also has its own post-
Soviet heritage, which is not unlike that of Russia:
corruption, crony capitalism, clientelism and an authori-
tarian political culture will be major problems occupying
students of Ukraine for some time to come.
Perhaps the principal irony of the situation is that the
Soviet impact on Ukraine was by no means as negative as
many Ukrainians have suggested. Ukraine actually devel-
oped a greater sense of nationhood under Soviet rule than
was ever possible before 1917. The Soviet government
recognized Ukrainian language, culture and nationhood
and gave ‘‘Soviet’’ Ukraine a set of borders – even while
oppressing Ukrainian peasantsmercilessly in the 1930s and
ruthlessly stamping out Ukrainian resistance to Soviet rule
after the Second World War (von Hagen, 2003; Martin,
2002; Weiner, 2001).
The role of American and to a lesser extent European
politics in the region has intensiﬁed conﬂict between
Russia and Ukraine, as well as the stakes of that conﬂict. On
both the Russian and the American side, residual Cold War15 ‘‘‘It’s fairly simple: We hate Russia,’ said an Estonian diplomat in
Tallin.’’ Khanna, Second World, p. 3.
16 Wilson, Unexpected Nation, pp. 280, 288–89, 301.
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nan’s ‘‘containment’’ policy did not end when the Soviet
Union became merely Russia again, nor did the idea that
Russian inﬂuence could be ‘‘rolled back’’, as John Foster
Dulles believed a half century ago. What successive Amer-
ican governments (including, apparently, President Oba-
ma’s new one) regard as ‘‘spreading democracy’’ is
understood by the Russian political class as intrusion into
the space in which Russian inﬂuence should play a signiﬁ-
cant, if not decisive, role. Hostility between the United
States and Russia makes the political struggles in Ukraine
between East and West seem matters of earth-shaking
importance.17
By contrast, there seems to be little trace of American
inﬂuence in Belarus, where national consciousness has
been late in developing, to say nothing of democratic-
mindedness.18 There Soviet power still provides the model
and American inﬂuence is insigniﬁcant. But American and
European inﬂuence has been considerable in Western
Ukraine; the Europeans have been rather more inclined,
however, not to see the region quite so much in terms of
hostile camps. The possibility of serious political conﬂict
between Ukraine and Russia is quite real, if a passage at
arms is unlikely. It would be triggered by particular issues:
perhaps most likely over the situation of the Russian Black
Sea Fleet, in particular whether the leasing of the naval base
at Sevastopol shall go forward, among other issues. The
increasing American inﬂuence in Ukraine, is a serious issue
for Russia, the most provocative aspect perhaps being
American activism in assisting (the Russians would say
‘‘sponsoring’’) the ‘‘orange revolution’’. So there is still at
least a Russian orbit which – perhaps including Serbia –
could be called a ‘‘near abroad’’ of the former empire,
although it is far from uncontested.
At a deeper level the level, problems of American
penetration of a self-deﬁned ‘‘Russian’’ sphere of inﬂuence
yield to the profoundly confused histories of Russia and
Ukraine: similar languages, unclear borders, mixed pop-
ulations, entangled economies, overlapping historical
claims; and as a result ‘‘deformed national identities’’.19
Russia, the ‘‘historic nation’’, ﬁnds it particularly difﬁcult to
surrender its mastery over Ukraine amid all the other post-
imperial traumas fromwhich it suffers, as the new Russian
ﬁlm version of Gogol’s Taras Bulba, for example, demon-
strates. The director, Vladmir Bortko, himself a Ukrainian,
told the press that ‘‘there is no separate Ukraine.’’ In his
view ‘‘the Russian people are one.’’ Gogol himself demon-
strates the tangle. He is of course considered a major ﬁgure
in the Russian literary canon and wrote in Russian, some-
times from a Russian nationalist point of view. But he was
born in Ukraine and many Ukrainians claim him as17 The best account of the events of 2004 is AndrewWilson’s The Orange
Revolution (2007). But see also, inter alia, the Washington Post’s investi-
gation of American involvement. Articles have been collected in the blog
truthout, Tuesday, January 27, 2009.
18 See Andrew Savchenko’s new study of contemporary Belarus, forth-
coming from Brill Publishers in Leiden, Holland.
19 For a good collection of articles on the historically complex and
troubled Russian–Ukrainian relationship (though a bit dated at this
point), see Taras Kuzio (1998).a Ukrainian writer as well.20 In the midst of the economic
turndown, Ukraine remains for the moment on its historic
fault line between ‘‘Europe’’ and ‘‘Eurasia’’. That faultline
also runs through Moldova (Barry, 2009).
The relationship between the nations of the Caucasus
and Russia is problematic as well. The culture and politics
of Europe attract them, but Russian power is near at hand,
and the criminal world emanating from the late Soviet
Union strengthens the Russian tie (Glenny, 2008). Particu-
larly in Ukraine and Georgia, we see Russia attempting to
retain as much of its longtime inﬂuence as possible.
The borderlands in the deeply unstable Caucasus region
are quite different from those to the northwest, where the
obstacles to the expansion of Russian inﬂuence are many
and powerful. Russian oil and natural gas are important for
European nations, but Europe hasmany cards to play. In the
Caucasus, Russia borders on small states without adequate
resources individually or collectively to oppose or absorb
Russian power, despite episodic American incitement to do
so. The Euro–American world has adopted a quite different
attitude toward the Caucasian border between Russia and
its neighbors than it did in Europe, in particular to the
Islamic states there and in Central Asia. This is in part
because Islamic extremism has replaced Sovietism as the
principal challenge to American world leadership. The
change is, from one point of view deeper than that: the
Caucasus and central Asia are now part of what Euro–
Americans call ‘‘the Middle East.’’ America and Russia both
oppose Islamic fundamentalism, but Russia aspires to
continue as regional hegemon, even as the United States
opposes any increase in Russian inﬂuence. This puts the
United States in the awkward position of trying to extend
its inﬂuence right up to Russia’s borders, while at the same
time pressing the Russians to use their inﬂuence to
persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program and to
continue to oppose Islamic fundamentalism in the
expanded ‘‘Middle East’’.
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have lived at the
conﬂuence of the larger worlds of the Ottoman Empire/
Turkey, Persia/Iran and Russia in its changing manifesta-
tions now for centuries. Their relations with each other and
with the great powers in the region are of enormous
complexity. Because of the Armenian diaspora, especially
that signiﬁcant part of it concentrated in the United States,
American–Armenian relations remain cordial. But Armenia
also needs good relations with Russia, as a hedge against
Turkey and Azerbaijan. The oil resources of Azerbaijan and
the vast complexity of pipeline politics, however, have
made the region a notably complex and violent mixture of
corporate and criminal intrigue; nepotism ﬂourishes and
the Aliyev clan continues to play a notable role in all aspects
of Azeri political life. The problem of Nagorno–Karabagh
continues to fester.
The situation in Chechnya represents the most dire
possible scenario for the leaders of Russia. The prospect in
Chechnya is for an ongoing insurgency, at once nationalist
and Islamist, which threatens not only the stability of the20 Ellen Barry, ‘‘A Wild Cossack, Claimed by Russia and Ukraine, Rides
Into a Cultural Battle,’’ New York Times, April 13, 2009, p. 6.
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the Islamic world. It also foregrounds aspects of Russia’s
domestic politics which it would prefer not to display to the
world: its belief in the ultimate efﬁcacy of force, not to
mention its resort to collective punishment and its practice
of state terrorism. Perhaps even more embarrassing for the
Russian leadership is their inability to ﬁnish the job.
The differences between the NATO allies have been
considerable on how directly to challenge Russian political
inﬂuence, particularly energy interests, in the Caucasus.
Under both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the United
States adopted quite a forward policy, pressing to bring
both Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and both encouraging
surrogates and acting directly to establish its inﬂuence on
elites. Germany and France, by contrast, have been much
more cautious, in part because of their energy dependence
on Russia, in part merely because of their greater proximity.
The United States played a considerable role in Georgia’s
brief, unfortunate war with Russia in 2008, to nobody’s
advantage. The United States educated and trained Mikheil
Saakashvili – the Russians would undoubtedly say
‘‘recruited’’– although the Americans never use the word.
No doubt Washington urged restraint on Saakashvili at the
end, but American ofﬁcials surely gave him to understand
that his challenge to Russia had American support.
The study of the Caucasus and Central Asia is thus likely
to retain an entirely different character from the European
borderlands. Political contestation is far more evident,
energy and its transmission are major issues, and both
political and economic development strategies are as yet
uncertain. These are parts of ‘‘Eurasia’’ which are far closer
to what they were in Soviet times, beset with linguistic,
religious and ethnic conﬂict, not to speak of economic
underdevelopment and problems of political representa-
tion. Researchers will be investigating the authoritarian
political cultures there, the corruption and arms trafﬁcking,
even as the peoples of the region are having their ﬁrst direct
encounters with market relations thrust upon them. They
are watching closely to see how the transition to political
democracy and the market is proceeding, but new points of
view are slow to take hold in this part of the world.21
Soviet inﬂuence was very strong in the Islamic states of
Central Asia, beginning in the mid-1920s. Marxism
demanded that the cultures there should develop or ‘‘be
developed’’ toward nationhood, and Soviet authorities
devised national frameworks into which they set the still
nomadic cultures of the region, attempting to name ‘‘the
-stans’’ according to what they judged to be the dominant
national group. Although Soviet ‘‘nation-building’’ and
development policies were less than successful in much of
the U.S.S.R., they were highly signiﬁcant, if sometimes
extremely harsh, in Muslim Central Asia.
The Soviets built schools, railways, roads and hospi-
tals. but much of the Soviet legacy was calamitous:
collectivization bred mass famine, particularly among
the nomadic Kazakhs; thousands of Central Asians were
incarcerated or killed in Stalin’s purges; Soviet industrial21 Mesbahi, Central Asia and the Caucasus, p. 2; Glenny, McMaﬁa.agriculture, particularly cotton cultivation, brought
environmental disaster; and for seven decades the
region was almost completely cut off from foreign
inﬂuences (Lewis, 2008).
These circumstances help explainwhy somuch of Soviet
nomenklatura continued in power there, albeit under
different names.22 American interest in the region
increased dramatically after 2001, when the attack on the
World Trade Center made Afghanistan, along with Iraq,
a major focus of American foreign policy. Local elites seem
to have been struck by the American superiority in wealth
and military organization, but not by American follow-
through and commitment to a long-term presence in the
region.23
In the east and south, the Indian and Chinese economies
are already crowding Russia. Despite Russia’s energy
resources and all their political uses, the booming econo-
mies and expanding populations of China and India too
contrast almost grotesquely with Russia’s looming demo-
graphic crises and dwindling Slavic population. Large
Chinese populations continue to move into the underpop-
ulated regions of Russian Asia. To put the matter starkly,
can a shrinking Russia, facing major demographic difﬁcul-
ties, rally and reconstitute a Eurasian Empire of the sort we
have been discussing? It seems extremely unlikely. It seems
far more plausible that Russia might serve as a junior
partner of the Chinese in resisting the ‘‘West’’ – the
Americans and the EU. What were in earlier days the
peripheries of ‘‘Eurasia’’ may in the future be contesting for
dominance over the uncertain center.
At the end of the day, then, we may provisionally
conclude that the unity of post-Soviet ‘‘Eurasia’’ is frag-
mentary and ﬂeeting. It competes in the West with the
much more powerful paradigm of ‘‘Europe’’. It competes in
the East and Southeast with the formidable economic
power of China and India, both of which are global, rather
than regional players. China, once considered a ThirdWorld
country, is now regarded by some analysts as a global
superpower, alongside the U.S. and the European Union
(Khanna, 2008b). India, alongside Russia, is considered in
a widely noticed volume a part of the ‘‘Second World,’’ but
India is growing and Russia is shrinking. The ‘‘Middle East’’
has spread its chaotic agony towards Russia’s ‘‘soft under-
belly’’ (to steal a Churchillian coinage). The United States
and Russia have more than one reason to cooperate, in
containing Islamic fundamentalism in the amorphous
‘‘Middle East’’. But the American determination to bring
NATO right up to Russia’s frontiers has made that cooper-
ation difﬁcult to achieve.
No people or nation that passed through the crucible of
the Soviet experience has escaped its powerful inﬂuence.
The Communists conferred nationhood on Ukraine (if they
then proceed to brutalize it). The Muslim peoples of Central
Asia were sped through a peculiar and disruptive process of
nation-building under Russian–Soviet aegis, and their
future trajectory will long show its effects. To the West, the22 Mesbahi, Central Asia and the Caucasus, pp. 56–57.
23 Lewis, Temptations of tyranny, pp. 214–215.
A. Gleason / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 26–3232nations that can understand themselves as European will
prefer to do so. The positive, attractive power of a ‘‘Eurasian
idea’’ under any kind of Russian hegemony is at present
negligible. It is difﬁcult to see any combination of powers
recapitulating some version of Chingisid or post-Chingisid
power structures.24 Only Chinese leadership might
conceivably do so.25 But of course Eurasia is also a trope,
a ﬁgure of speech. Future hegemons might still, under
certain circumstances, ﬁnd it useful.References
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